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Abstract 
A review of the existing literature suggests that employees in unionized workplaces have 
significantly more voice mechanisms present than in non-unionized workplaces. In India, 
historically, the trade unions have played the role of an agent of social and economic 
changes, protecting and enhancing the interest of its members and trying to squeeze more 
and more out of managements through bargaining or conflict. Unions protect workers 
directly from arbitrary discipline while providing management with a means of managing 
the work force that does not call on the use of overt sanctions since industrial action 
performed an additional voice function. It is observed that meaningful and lasting 
employee participation occurs only when the union has sufficient power to induce the 
management to forgo some of its traditional prerogatives; the union and management 
share a vision of how participation could serve the interests of both the parties; and when 
the union has substantial institutional security. Presence of a powerful collective 
bargaining machinery and proactive communication between the management and the 
unions not only minimises the grievances but also promotes healthy industrial relations. 
Workers have a reduced capacity to initiate issues and articulate grievances in the non-
unionized workplaces and they enjoy comparatively less benefits than their unionized 
counterparts. While workers joined unions because they thought unions could protect    
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them against victimization, secure the wage increases, and ensure job security and 
improved conditions of work, on the other hand, in the absence of unions, employees may 
not raise disputes because of fear of victimization, fear of being branded disloyal to the 
organization, and fear of reprisals by the management. Based on the literature review 
and analysis, a framework linking union density, employee prolificacy to raise disputes, 
management propensity to make decisions unilaterally, and workers intention to quit has 
been suggested.  
 
1. Introduction 
Disputes and their resolution has been a subject of intensive research for several decades 
now. While some scholars consider disputes as destructive, others consider them as 
opportunities to create awareness about problems and improve internal management. 
Hellman (1993) perhaps brings out the dichotomy succinctly when he suggests that 
agreement is not necessarily good but the neither is disagreement especially when people 
disagree for the sake of disagreeing, as a way to assert themselves and to avoid feeling 
dominated. In the Indian context disputes, under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a 
dispute is raised when an employment contract is not carried out. The issues could 
include wage demands, union rivalry, political interference, unfair labour practices as 
described in the fifth schedule of the ID Act, multiplicity of labour laws, industrial 
sickness etc. The dispute resolution framework under the ID Act consists of Conciliation, 
Arbitration and Adjudication. Apart from this, in line with the theories of industrial 
jurisprudence, in the unionized context there are collective bargaining, establishment of 
works committee, discipline management and grievance resolution procedures, which    
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help prevent disputes in the first place. Despite the contention that formation of labour 
unions is necessary for the survival of the workers (Vickery, 1999) and the concern that 
workers have a reduced capacity to initiate issues and articulate grievances in the non-
unionized workplaces (Kaufman and Taras, 1999) and they enjoy less benefits, there 
seems to be a link between the use of high performance work systems and the adoption of 
non-union dispute resolution procedures (Colvin, 2003). The study by Batt, Colvin and 
Keefe (2002) indicated that while union presence had a negative relationship with quit 
rates, the prediction for non-union dispute resolution procedures was uncertain as they 
may be designed to encourage or suppress employee voice. However, rising adoption of 
individual contracts and union substitution by non-union employers is leading to adoption 
of non-unionized dispute resolution mechanisms at the workplace (Colvin, 2003). As 
discussed previously, to obviate the need of unionisation of their organizations, 
managements employ strategies such as effective supervision, open communication, 
effective personnel research, healthy and safe working environment, effective employer-
employee relations, effective remuneration, effective training and development 
programmes, effective personnel planning, recruitment & selection, strategic human 
resource management system, strategies leading to reduction of support for unions and 
contracting of work. Besides, at times, even employees realise the negative consequences 
of unionization and stay away from unions (Aswathappa, 2001). This could stem from 
their misgivings regarding union effectiveness, fear of company closure in the wake of 
adverse union relationships, and pursuit of personal goals in terms of rewards and 
control.  
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2.  Dispute Resolution in the Indian Context 
In the Indian context, since disputes are resolved under the ID Act, the emergence of the 
non-union firms would have no effect on the dispute resolution framework of 
conciliation, arbitration and adjudication in some specific cases. Under section 2A of the 
ID Act, “where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates 
the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman 
and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, 
retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding 
that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute”. However, 
even here, whether the employees exercise these options in the first place is debatable as 
can be concluded from the preceding literature. With the emergence of non-union forms, 
mechanisms of industrial jurisprudence like collective bargaining become redundant. 
However, other mechanisms of providing voice to the employees and pre-empting 
disputes emerge in the non-unionized workplaces. It emerges from the preceding 
discussion that for being successful though, these mechanisms need to be efficient, user 
friendly, accessible, non-punitive, and confidential. These include Open door policy, peer 
reviewed panels, ombudsperson, and employee involvement techniques.  
Research indicates that the factors that contribute to the adoption of dispute resolution 
mechanisms include the structure of the mechanisms (Loewenberg, 1984), the role of the 
union steward (Dalton and Todor, 1982), the applicable rights of the employees and the 
mandate and the relationship between the employer and the employee (Meyer and Cooke, 
1988). Bendersky (2003) argues that the design of the dispute resolution procedures 
assumes that disputes can be matched to the most appropriate type of dispute resolution    
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component and this assumption limits the component’s effectiveness when they act 
independently or in parallel because few disputes fall neatly into any one category and 
can be manifested variously. He states that a dispute resolution system is complementary 
only when the dispute resolution components interact to mitigate the limitations of each 
individual component and the synergy can be obtained only when employees can use any 
type of component for any kind of conflict and can use multiple components to address 
the same conflict. Also the complimentary system has the ability to increase individual’s 
psychological motivation to work towards the group’s interests by heightening their sense 
of participation in decision making processes and affiliation with the organization besides 
offering substantial voice mechanisms, which are perceived by employees to be 
procedurally just. Based on these variables any one or more of the several voice 
mechanisms may be provided by the organization for its employees.  
Justice research indicates that providing opportunities to voice grievances can elicit 
perceptions of procedural justice from individuals who experience the prospect of 
adverse outcomes (Barry, 2000). In fact the fairness perceptions may stem from all three 
kinds of justice that constitute organizational justice; distributive justice which focuses on 
the fairness of distribution of outcomes, procedural justice, which is concerned about the 
fairness of the processes by which outcomes are distributed, and interactional justice that 
deals with the fairness of interpersonal interactions and communications. In a naturally 
occurring field experiment in which an intervention to improve a grievance procedure 
was introduced and the removed, Mesch & Dalton (1992) found that the interrupted time 
series experimental design resulted in more compromise resolutions and a dramatic 
increase in the number of grievances filed. The enhancement of fairness perceptions takes    
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place both through instrumental and non-instrumental mechanisms. Perceptions of fair 
procedures have instrumental value if they lead to fair rewards while the non-
instrumental value connotes a sense of treating employees with respect (Naumann et al., 
1995). Studies indicate that grievant’s interest in using voice simply for the non-
instrumental sake of being heard or socially valued  rather than to actually influence 
outcomes, seems to increase when they perceive that there are less opportunities to 
influence outcomes (Barry, 2000). This implies that if they wish grievants to derive non-
instrumental satisfaction with an appeals process, listeners to grievances would need to 
demonstrate convincingly that instrumental action on behalf of the grievant is truly 
unavailable. Moreover, unfavourable outcomes that are reached by fair processes 
generate higher distributive justice ratings than favourable outcomes reached by unfair 
processes (Blancero, 1995).  
Studies (Benson, 2000) have indicated that employees in unionized workplaces were 
found to have significantly more voice mechanisms present than in non-unionized 
workplaces. In fact the study by Batt, Colvin and Keefe (2002) indicated that while union 
presence had a negative relationship with quit rates, the prediction for non-union dispute 
resolution procedures was uncertain as they may be designed to encourage or suppress 
employee voice. In India, historically, the trade unions have played the role of an agent of 
social and economic changes, protecting and enhancing the interest of its members and 
trying to squeeze more and more out of managements through bargaining or conflict. To 
achieve this, they have resorted to several means ranging from collective bargaining and 
representation to strikes and disruptive activities. Moreover, despite the presence of 
several industrial acts, the grievance procedures do not receive much attention due to    
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complexities arising out of inarticulate treatment and lack of understanding of issues in 
bargaining, joint consultation, and grievance redressal by all the actors in the industrial 
relations system. Unions protect workers directly from arbitrary discipline while 
providing management with a means of managing the work force that does not call on the 
use of overt sanctions since industrial action performed an additional voice function. The 
procedures for direct employee involvement in form of suggestion schemes, joint 
departmental councils, and open house meetings are seen to be successful only in the 
presence of a union. It is the presence of union officials in such forums and their 
pursuance of issues that indeed makes them effective. Preceding discussions have 
suggested that even the efficacy of quality circles has shown mixed results in the India 
context. It is observed that meaningful and lasting employee participation occurs only 
when the union has sufficient power to induce the management to forgo some of its 
traditional prerogatives; the union and management share a vision of how participation 
could serve the interests of both the parties; and when the union has substantial 
institutional security. Presence of a powerful collective bargaining machinery and 
proactive communication between the management and the unions not only minimises 
the grievances but also promotes healthy industrial relations. Thus it would seem 
plausible that union density would have different direct effects on worker behaviours like 
quit rates. 
Moreover, studies (Kaufman and Taras, 1999) have found that workers have a reduced 
capacity to initiate issues and articulate grievances in the non-unionized workplaces and 
they enjoy comparatively less benefits than their unionized counterparts. In the Indian 
context, the study by Bhattacherjee (2001) points out that there is a felt need for tripartite    
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consultations relating to the various issues borne out of economic reforms. It has also 
been noted that the trade unions can be much more than mere wage bargainers (Davala, 
1996), and workers joined unions because they thought unions could protect them against 
victimization, secure the wage increases, and ensure job security and improved 
conditions of work (Gani, 1996). On the other hand, in the absence of unions, employees 
may not raise disputes because of fear of victimization, fear of being branded disloyal to 
the organization, and fear of reprisals by the management. This would suggest that union 
density would also result in different prolificacy rates of workers to raise disputes which 
in turn, in accordance with justice theories, would relate to behavioural outcomes. Thus, 
it is plausible that union density has an effect on quit rates indirectly through workers’ 
propensity to raise disputes.  
Given the contention of strategic perspective of industrial relations that with growing 
realization of the centrality of the performance of the human resource in today’s 
competitive environment, organizations are pursuing policies at the top and bottom which 
weaken collective bargaining and encourage unitarist strategies (Ramaswamy, 2000), it is 
also plausible that union density would be directly related to management’s propensity to 
take unilateral decisions. Moreover, the prolificacy of workers to raise disputes would 
have an effect on the management decision making since the interaction between these 
two actors is also dependent on the power relations between them (Ramaswamy, 2000). It 
is likely that a lower prolificacy rate of workers to raise disputes would lead to a higher 
propensity on the management’s part to take decisions unilaterally. With similar 
arguments it is also likely that the union density be indicative of the management’s 
propensity to unilateral decision making.      
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Based on the preceding discussion it appears that union density, employees’ prolificacy 
to raise disputes, managements’ propensity to make decisions unilaterally and employee 
attitudes such as intention to quit would be interlinked with both direct and indirect 
effects. It is therefore likely that union density would have direct effects on employees’ 
prolificacy to raise disputes, management’s propensity to take unilateral decisions and 
employee’s intention to quit such that a high union density would be associated with high 
prolificacy on part of employees to raise disputes, low propensity of management to take 
unilateral decisions and low intention to quit. Also, the relationship between union 
density and intention to quit would be mediated by employee prolificacy to raise disputes 
and management propensity to take unilateral decision such that high union density 
would lead to high employee prolificacy to raise disputes. This in turn would lead to low 
management propensity to take decisions unilaterally and thereupon lower intentions to 
quit. This plausible relationship has been depicted as a tentative model and propositions 
















Intention to Quit    
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3.  Propositions 
 
Based on the previous discussions, following propositions can be advanced: 
 
P1 (a)  High union density would result in high prolificacy on the part of employees to 
raise disputes. 
P1 (b)  High union density would result in low management propensity to make decisions 
unilaterally. 
P1 (c)  High union density would result in low intention to quit on part of employees. 
P2  The relationship between union density and intention to quit would be mediated 
by employee prolificacy to raise disputes and management propensity to take 
unilateral decisions. 
 
The preceding literature suggests that the above model would have to control for certain 
variables like organizational support, procedural justice, leader member exchange quality, 
psychological contract, industry characteristics, gender etc. This could be argued from a 
social exchange perspective which would suggest that fair and supportive employers 
would benefit when circumstances become less favourable. In a study of 147 skilled trade 
employees at a manufacturing facility who had been informed of their impending 
permanent layoff, Naumann et al. (1995) found that the perceptions of organizational 
support mediated the relationship between the dimensions of interactional justice and 
organizational commitment. In another study which used the leader-member exchange 
model as a guide on a sample of 150 unionised blue collar employees of a large    
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automotive company who had access to a grievance procedure, Cleyman et al. (1995) 
found that there was a negative relationship between quality of information exchange and 
grievance filing. It appeared that high quality information exchange facilitated informal 
dispute resolution through increased communication and perceptions of procedural 
justice. Considering that employee perceptions of organizational support would be 
influenced by various aspects of their treatment by the organization, such as 
management’s likely responses to the employee performance, mistakes, comments, health 
etc. (Naumann et al., 1995) while the leader member exchange quality may depend upon 
consideration behaviours, friendliness and approachability of leaders (Cleyman et al., 
1995) it seems likely that fair and just procedures along with perceived support and 
interpersonal communication would go a long way in minimising grievances and 
providing quick resolutions when they actually arise. Similarly, the psychological 
contract theory stresses on the social exchange process in the establishment and is greatly 
influenced by the organizational support theory (Aselage and Eisenberger, 2003). These 
results would also hold good in the Indian context since the scales developed to measure 
the constructs are independent of context. Since these variables also have impact on 
behavioural outcomes of employees, it is likely that organizational support, procedural 
justice, leader member exchange quality and psychological contract would affect both the 
relationships between union density and employee prolificacy to raise disputes, and 
between union density and intention to quit. Besides, industry characteristics, gender etc 
could also have an effect on the relationship between voice and quit intentions (Batt, 
Colvin and Keefe, 2002). Subsequent studies should develop propositions looking at 




The paradigms governing the employee relationships have changed in the post reforms 
world. Earlier, employees enjoyed the comforts of lifetime employment, company 
sponsored health programmes and retirement pensions but post reforms, these 
relationships have undergone a sea change. Employees are now expected to work in multi 
faceted teams, and update their skills continuously. The restructuring on the other hand 
instils in them a feeling of job insecurity. Thus there is a need to carefully balance the 
traditional relationship characteristics and the demand of the new era to minimize the 
retention-relevant outcomes. In the context of industrial disputes and their subsequent 
resolution, unions would have to re-examine their roles and responsibilities and advance 
through alliance building, communications, organising, and staff development. Union 
leaders would have to be alive to the enormous and shifting differences between labour 
and management organizations instead of trying to perpetuate leadership by virtue of 
their strong political affiliations or else they would become ineffective and redundant in 
the context of employer driven decentralization of collective bargaining and the 
concomitant promotion of Human Resource Management. They would need to represent 
non-traditional constituents such as new entrants at the higher end of the labour markets 
including professional and white collar workers, casual workers, both part time and 
temporary, home-based workers, and women workers and enhance their internal 
communication. Unions can strengthen themselves by deploying their political and 
organizational capacities to ensure obligatory, standardized workplace training 
curriculum by employers thereby enhancing the employment stability of the employees.    
  13
Given the contention of strategic perspective of industrial relations that with growing 
realization of the centrality of the performance of the human resource in today’s 
competitive environment, organizations are pursuing policies at the top and bottom which 
weaken collective bargaining and encourage unitarist strategies as well as union 
substitution by organizations, the study of non-unionised workplaces in the context of 
disputes and dispute resolution becomes significant. As discussed in the preceding 
literature, various alternate mechanisms have been provided by organizations to provide 
voice to their employees in absence of the trade unions. It can be said that formal 
grievance procedures arise from structural and environmental determinants of increased 
dependency of organizational participants. While voice and fairness perceptions help in 
minimizing and resolving grievances it would appear from a social exchange perspective 
that fair and supportive employers would benefit when circumstances become less 
favourable. Since perceptions of justice at workplace are associated with a variety of 
employee attitudes and behaviours, it is imperative that attention be paid to conflict 
resolution procedures. Employee involvement enables employees to respond to solve 
problems, act at work within their own authority while providing them with a high degree 
of self esteem, empowerment, learning environment, opportunities for personal growth 
and development, and a sense of achievement. From the organization’s perspective, 
employee involvement offers a competitive advantage to organizations by creating an 
environment which encourages challenge, innovation, continuous improvement, 
employee motivation, and organizational development. However, its application demands 
time, control, support, and commitment, both from the management and then unions. A 
high involvement organization can have an empowering culture which translates into    
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increased acceptance of decisions and continuous improvement. The above framework 
has implications both for the practitioners and scholars alike in understanding the nuances 
of presence or absence of voice mechanisms, especially the unions in the Indian context. 
An empirical testing of the propositions suggested should throw some interesting results 
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